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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a petition for rehearing of a memorandum opinion of the Court of Appeals filed
November 4, 1994. (Addendum A)
FACTS
Plaintiffs, after some negotiation, sold and conveyed to the Defendants, Michael R.
McCoy and Eugene E. Doms as tenants in common, certain property located in Park City,
Summit County, Utah (Exhibit 1), The defendants closed the sale, paid a substantial amount on
the purchase price of $276,750.00, and delivered to the plaintiffs a promissory note secured by
a trust deed on the Park City property. (Exhibit 2) The note was in the amount of $194,250.00.
The defendants failed to perform in accordance with the provisions of the promissory note and
in due course an action to foreclose the trust deed as a mortgage was instituted. The payees on

the promissory note and the beneficiaries of the trust deed were Mr. Anderson and Mr. Scott,
their wives not being a party to the financing transaction. (Exhibits 2 and 3) The defendant
McCoy failed to answer the foreclosure complaint and his undivided one-half interest in the
property was duly foreclosed and sold at sheriffs sale. The defendant Doms caused the default
against him to be set aside and filed his answer and counterclaim. The counterclaim requested
rescission based on fraud and on the doctrine contained in Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123
(Utah 1984). During the trial the counterclaimant Doms abandon his claim of fraud. For more
details and discussion of the facts please refer to attached Addendum A which are the facts set
forth in the plaintiffs' brief, pages 6 through 11.

ARGUMENT
In Brown v. Pickard, 11 P. 513 (Utah 1886), denying rehearing, the Utah Supreme Court
stated the standard for granting a petition for rehearing: "To justify a rehearing, a strong case
must be made. We must be convinced that the court failed to consider some material point in
the case, or that it erred in its conclusions . . . ." In Cummings v. Nielson. 129 P. 619, 624
(Utah 1913), the Court declared:
To make an application for a rehearing is a matter of right, and we
have no desire to discourage the practice of filing petitions for
rehearing in proper cases. When this Court, however, has
considered and decided all of the material questions involved in the
case, a rehearing should not be applied for unless we have
misconstrued or overlooked some material fact or facts, or have
overlooked some statute or decision which may affect the result,
or that we have based the decision on some wrong principle of
law, or have either misapplied or overlooked something which
materially affects the result . . . if there are some reasons,
however, such as we have indicated above, or other good reasons,
a petition for rehearing should be promptly filed and, if it is
2

meritorious, its form will in no case be scrutinized by this Court.
The following sections of this petition will establish that, applying these standards, the plaintiffs'
petition for rehearing is properly before the Court and should be granted because the Court has
overlooked material issues of fact and misconstrued issues of law which should be decided in
plaintiffs' favor.
POINT I
RESCISSION IS NOT APPLICABLE BECAUSE THIS IS AN
EXECUTED CONTRACT RATHER THAN AN EXECUTORY
CONTRACT.
The case of Bergstrom v. Moore so heavily relied on by the defendant involved an
executory contract wherein the court was able to determine that the contract could not be
completed in accordance with its terms. However, the present case involves an executed
contract. No preceding contract of purchase existed in this case. However, the Utah courts
have time after time held that all representations are merged into the final document, which in
this case is a deed. The doctrine of merger is well established in the State of Utah. See e.g.
Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168. 169 (Utah 1977) (" . . . therefore, in such a case the deed
is the final agreement and all prior terms, whether written or verbal, are extinguished and
unenforceable.") See also Embassy Group v. Hatch. 227 Utah Adv. Rep. 60 (Utah Ct. App
1993). The violation of the terms of an executed contract give rise to an action for damages and
not for rescission which if granted would destroy the contract including the basis for rescission.
If the counterclaimant Doms has any action, it is only an action in contract for damages.

3

POINT II
THE RECORD IS REPLETE WITH FACTS THAT
CONSTITUTE PREJUDICE TO THE PLAINTIFFS
THEREBY PROHIBITING A DECREE OF RESCISSION
MANY YEARS AFTER THE DATE OF THE CONTRACT.
In order to effect rescission, there must be a tender of the title to the plaintiffs. As
indicated in Perrv v. WoodalL 438 P.2d 813, 815 (Utah 1968) "The law is well settled that one
electing to rescind a contract must tender back to the other party whatever property of value he
has received." Doms did not tender the property because he did not own it. The property had
been transferred to Summit County Title Company as trustee (Exhibit 2) and thereafter to
Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. (Exhibit 16). Subsequently, as a result of the failure to pay real estate
taxes, the property was sold to Summit County on May 27, 1987. At no time and even to the
present date has Doms ever tendered the title to the plaintiff. Of course, he didn't have title;
therefore, he obviously could not tender the same. (Refer to Reply Brief of Appellants, Point
I, Section B, commencing on page 8.) This inability to tender title and the failure to tender
obviously prejudices plaintiffs and destroys the basis for rescission.
Doms knew of the encumbrances prior to the sale (Findings of Fact #43, Addendum #16
to plaintiffs' brief). The sale was dated March 23, 1982 (Exhibits 1, 2, and 3). Answer and
counterclaim was filed January 29, 1988, more than five years after taking possession and the
amended counterclaim was filed January 15, 1988. (R 102-55) See attached Addendum C
which outlines the time periods involved in this action.
The plaintiffs owned 100% interest in the property and Doms acquired from them only
an undivided one-half interest, and therefore, even if the one-half interest had been tendered, it
wasn't sufficient to put the plaintiffs back in the position they were prior to the sale. Because
4

Doms could not and did not tender the total title to the plaintiffs, they were automatically
prejudiced for they could not take any action to mitigate damages or cause the resale of the
property. This constitutes some six years of prejudice. The whims and vagaries of the market
were entirely under the control of the defendants to the prejudice of the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs were further prejudiced by defendants' non-payment of real estate taxes.
Although Defendant Doms had agreed to pay all taxes that accrued against the property, he
failed to so do for more than four years. The property was sold at tax sale to Summit County.
The tax sale vested the title to the property in Summit County, thereby making it impossible for
Doms and/or McCoy to tender title to the plaintiffs. The tax sale also eliminated the plaintiffs'
security interest in the property which prejudiced plaintiffs because the property secured a
substantial promissory note. Defendants' failure to pay taxes caused the loss of the security.
Prejudice to plaintiffs due to defendants extraordinary delay is also exemplified by the death of
plaintiff D. C. Anderson. Mr. Anderson was the original developer of the property and the
person who negotiated the sale of the property to Doms and McCoy.

Anderson's death

prejudiced the plaintiffs' position because he can no longer testify and thus the death has caused
a loss of evidence. In support of its assertion that prejudice must be demonstrable, the court
cited Small v. Badenhop, 701 P.2d 647 (Hawaii 1985). However, the court overlooked that
portion of Small which specifically stated:
A court of equity, therefore, will only consider a claim
brought without unreasonable delay. Id. More explicitly, the
court will entertain a suit if it has been "brought without undue
delay after plaintiff knew of the wrong or knew of facts and
circumstances sufficient to impute such knowledge to him: and the
time lapse has not "resulted in prejudice to the defendant." Id.
(citing 3 S. Symons, Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence §528 (2d ed.
1948)). Prejudice has been found, for example, where fading
5

memories or death has caused the loss of evidence, where changes
in the value of the subject matter or in the defendant's position
have occurred, and where there are intervening rights of third
parties. Id. (citing W. McClintock, supra). And whether a claim
is barred by laches is "determined by the circumstances of each
particular case." Patterson v. Hewitt, 195 U.S. at 317, 25 S.Ct.
at 36.
701 P.2d at 657 (emphasis added). Several of the factors recited in Small are present in this
case.
In addition, since Doms and McCoy received full value for the property at the time they
conveyed it to the corporation, Doms would receive a windfall and plaintiffs would be prejudiced
if they now have to pay Doms a second time. Finding of Fact #34 (R. 6882) memorializes the
fact that Doms and Anderson met before the purchase of the property. Plaintiff is prejudiced
as Mr. Anderson's death precluded any testimony as to the formation of the contract. The
Papanikolas Bros. Ent. v. Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr., 35 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975), one of the
cases cited in the court's opinion states:
The existence of laches is one to be determined primarily by the
trial court; and reviewing courts will not interfere with the exercise
of the trial court's discretion in the matter, unless it appears that
a manifest injustice has been done or the decision cannot
reasonable be found to be supported by the evidence.
535 P.2d 1256 at 1260. The trial court heard evidence relating to the decreasing values of the
real estate, the tax sale, and the various transfers. The record in this case, the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Judgment are rife with examples of the prejudice that occurred to
the plaintiffs by reason of the failure of the defendant to act. To ignore these findings and
conclusions which developed from a hard-fought case results only in farther complicating an
already difficult case, adding time, attorneys' fees and costs to both parties.

6

Plaintiff Scott is additionally prejudiced because Doms failed to file any action against
Anderson's estate. Any such claim is barred and Mr. Scott is left with the entire obligation,
which is certainly a matter of substantial prejudice to him as he must assume the entire burden.
The court's opinion, in essence, states that the evidence showing depreciation of the value
of the property of about 37% (R. 7825, 7937) is insufficient to create prejudice which would bar
rescission. However, the court ignores the fact that the trial court stated that the evidence
constituted sufficient prejudice to bar rescission.
The record is replete with evidence of prejudice to the plaintiffs which should bar
rescission. The passage of time, the death of D. C. Anderson, the tax sale, the foreclosure and
sale of Mr. McCoy's interests and other events make it impossible to return the parties to the
position they were prior to the sale of the property. This Court erred by failing to consider
these circumstances all of which appear in the record.
POINT m
THIS COURT ALSO ERRED BY FAILING TO CONSIDER
PLAINTIFFS' STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ARGUMENT.
An action in rescission must be commenced within four years from the date that the party
knows of the basis for the rescission. In this case, the trial court found that the parties were
aware of the claimed encumbrances three months before the deed was executed; therefore, the
statutory period started running on the date of the deed. Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632 (Utah
1984) states that rescission is an equitable action and is governed by the four-year statute of
limitations in Utah Code Annotated §78-12-25(2). Baker also states that when the party knows
of problems the date of the recording of the deed sets forth the date for the commencement of
the limitation period.
7

The court of appeals decision relates entirely to the rescission action and does not even
address the statute of limitations question. Since the decision involved only the rescission,
presumably the statute of limitations for rescission must be applied. The only reason not to
apply the four-year limitation period would be if Doms could relate his claim back to the filing
of the complaint by the plaintiffs. The original plaintiffs were only Mr. Anderson and Mr. Scott
who were the beneficiaries of the promissory note and the trust deed. The trial court found that
the trust deed transaction was an entirely separate transaction from the conveyance. (R. 6890)
Therefore, Doms' counterclaim cannot relate back to the filing of the complaint as it involves
an entirely different transaction involving different parties. Rule 15c of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that the counterclaim must arise out of the same transaction. In the instant
case, new parties (Mrs. Anderson and Mrs. Scott) were added substantially after the statute of
limitations had expired. Doms' counterclaim constituted a new cause of action unrelated to the
plaintiffs' cause of action and added new parties. Under these circumstances the relation back
doctrine does not apply as argued in Point II of appellants' opening brief.
POINT IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED STATE V.
CARTER AND, IN DOING SO, IGNORED ESTABLISHED
PRINCIPLES OF UTAH LAW.
The court of appeals relied on State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 1989), as a basis for
not ruling upon or considering issues raised by the plaintiffs/appellants. Carter permits an
appellate court to avoid issuance of a written opinion on certain issues which the court finds are
without merit only after the claims have been "carefully analyzed" and given a "fair and
comprehensive" review by the appellate court.
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Carter, 776 P.2d at 889; Country Oaks

Condominium Management v. Jones, 851 P.2d 640, 643 (Utah 1993). Further, the "Carter
doctrine" can be invoked only when the claims subject to the doctrine are meritless or of no
effect. Carter, 776 P.2d at 889. Carter specifically interprets "meritless"claims to be those
which involve "established principles" or those which have "in substance been previously urged
upon this court and rejected." Id.
In this case, the issues presented by plaintiffs/appellants which this Court has refused to
address have not been "previously urged upon this court and rejected." Furthermore, where
those issues, such as application of the statute of limitations, application of the relation back
doctrine, validity of the deed and whether defendant Doms was a remote grantee and a real party
in interest, involve "established principles" of law, those "established principles" dictate an
outcome in favor of plaintiffs/appellants.

In fact, in several of the enumerated instances,

defendant/appellee presents no argument to contradict the issue. In other words, the court of
appeals' application of Carter is not only totally inappropriate but by applying Carter, the court
of appeals turns several "established principles" of Utah law upside down.
CONCLUSION
The court's memorandum opinion in this case discussed only one of the many issues
raised by both sides. The court erroneously applied State v. Carter to avoid issues which have
not been previously presented to it and which "established principles" of Utah law dictate should
be decided in plaintiffs/appellants favor.
Even the single issue discussed in the court's opinion, rescission, is discussed
incompletely and without reference to specific evidence and findings contrary to the court's
conclusion. For example, the court overlooked the fact that no tender of the property was ever
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made by Doms — an obvious prerequisite for rescission. The court also ignored arguments by
plaintiffs/appellants concerning the statute of limitations and the fact that Doms was not the
owner of the property which would require dismissal of the rescission action. Finally, the court
overlooked the numerous instances of prejudice to plaintiffs as disclosed to the trial court and
found in the record.
The court should rehear this case because it has not addressed the appropriate issues and
has failed to apply the appropriate facts and law concerning limitation of actions in cases
involving rescission.
Submitted this £ >

day of November, 1994.
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

JRYING^. BIELE
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Appellants
and Cross-Appellees
I hereby certify that this petition for rehearing is presented in good faith and not for
purposes of delay.
DATED this Ji

day of November, 1994.

:. 6IELE
"
"
s for Plaintiffs, Appellants
and Cross-Appellees
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing PETITION FOR
REHEARING was either hand delivered or mailed by United States Mail, postage prepaid this
<yt 5* clay of November, 1994.
Larry R. Keller, Esq.
Craig L. Boorman, Esq.
LARRY R. KELLER & ASSOCIATES
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

f.^/^^y

11

ADDENDUM A

Utah Court of Appeals

MOV 0 h tSS1)
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Ellen Anderson, as personal representative of the Estate of D.C. Anderson;
Ellen Anderson, personally; Dan Scott
and Jeanne Scott,
Plaintiffs, Appellants, and
Cross-Appellees,
v.
Michael R. McCoy; and Eugene E. Poms.
Defendant, Appellee, and
Cross-Appellant,

Marilyn M. Branch
Clerk of the Court
MEMORANDUM
DECISION
(Not For
Publication)
Case No. 920653-CA
F I L E D
(November 4, 1994)

Ellen Anderson, as personal representative of the Estate of D.C, Anderson;
Ellen Anderson, personally; Dan Scott
and Jeanne Scott,
Third-Party Plaintiffs, Appellants,
and Cross-Appellees,
v.
Summit County Title Company, a Utah
corporation,
Third-Party Defendants, and
Appellees,
Ellen Anderson, as personal representative of the Estate of D.C* Anderson;
Ellen Anderson, personally; Dan Scott
and Jeanne Scott,
Plaintiffs, Appellants, and
Cross-Appellees,
v.
Summit County, a body corporate and
politic of the State of Utah; and Blake
L. Frazier, in his official capacity as
Summit County Auditor; Gump & Ayers Real
Estate, Inc., a Utah corporation; Victor
R. Ayres; Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., a
Utah corporation; Eugene E. Poms;
unknown defendants described as John
Does 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5,
Defendants, Appellees, and
Cross-Appellant.

Third District, Summit County
The Honorable John A. Rokich
Attorneys:

Irving H. Biele and Curtis C. Nesset, Salt Lake City,
for Appellant
Larry R. Keller and Craig L. Boorman, Salt Lake City,
for Cross-Appellant Eugene Doms

Before Judges

Rr

lings, Greenwood, and Jacksoi 1.

JACKSON, Judge:
Appellants raise several challenges to the trial court's
determination to allow appellee (Doms) to proceed with his
counterclaim. Appellants' arguments relating to the countei c 1 i in
include whether the statute of limitations barred the
counterclaim, whether the counterclaim related back to the date
appellants filed their foreclosure action, whether the deed Doms
obtained from Domcoy was valid, whether Doms was the real party
in interest, whether Doms was a remote grantee, and whether the
trial court improperly joined involuntary plaintiffs. We agree
with the trial court's decision to allow Doms to proceed with his
counterclaim and find appellants' arguments
be without merit.
Thus, we decline to address them. See State v. Carter, 776 P. 2d
886, 896 (Utah 1989) (court may decline to address arguments
without merit on appeal).
I n ^jLg c r o s s - a ppeal, Doms asserts that the trial court
improperly applied the equitable doctrine of laches and refused
to rescind the Rossi Hills transaction. "To successfully assert
a laches defense, a defendant must establish both that the
plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing an action and that the
defendant was prejudiced by that delay." Borland v. Chandler.
733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1987); accord Papanikolas Brothers Enter,
v. Suaarhouse Shopping Center Assocs.. 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah
1975) ; Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Reagan Outdoor Advertising. Inc.,
751 P. 2d 270, 271 (Utah App. 1988) (defendant must establish
prejudice before laches defense may be successfully asserted) ;
see In re Petition of Merrill Cook. 249 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah
1994) (denying petition because petitioners failed to act with
reasonable diligence and because relief requested "could work a
substantial hardship on the State").

The trial court made findings concerning Doms's delay i n
bringing the action but made no findings as to whether appellants
were prejudiced by the delay.1 Therefore, we remand this case to
1. We note that we do not agree that any time property increases
or decreases in value, the prejudice prong of the laches defense
is automatically met. See Child v. Child, 332 P.2d 981, 988
(Utah 1958) ("natural increment" in value of property does not
constitute prejudice in laches claim); see also West Los Angeles
Institute for Cancer Research v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220, 228 (9th
Ci r. 1966) (mere increase or decrease in property value does not
(continued...)

920653-CA
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the trial court for the purpose of entering findings of fact
relevant to whether appellants were prejudiced by any delays in
Doms pursuing his counterclaim. If the trial court cannot find
from the evidence presented that the appellants were prejudiced
by the delay, the equitable doctrine of laches should not bar the
remedy of rescission.2 Accordingly, we remand this case to the
trial court

Norman H. Jackson-^Oudge

WE CONCUR:

fcPudith M. B i l l i n g s , J u d g e *

reenwood/ 1 Judge
1. (...continued)
alone convert delay into laches); Fitzgerald v. O'Connell, 386
A.2d 1384, 1388 (R.I. 1978); (fact that property appreciated does
not in and of itself convert delay into laches) ; Lincoln v.
Fisher. 339 P.2d 1084, 1098 (Or. 1959).
A change in property value is one factor courts should
consider in determining prejudice. Lawson v. Hanves, 170 F.2d
741, 744 (10th Cir. 1948); Filler v. Richland County, 806 P.2d
537, 540 (Mont. 1991); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 159
(Utah 1976). Further, other courts have determined that a change
iji property value did not prejudice landowners because the change
could be taken into account by a court of equity in fashioning a
just remedy. Small v. Badenhop> 701 P.2d 647, 658 (Haw. 1985).
2. Because it is possible that the trial court will order the
contract rescinded due to lack of evidence in the record
concerning prejudice, we need not address the other claims
raised. However, in the event the trial court does not rescind
the transaction, the trial court should note that its findings
and conclusions do not adequately treat the effect of the
intervening conveyances to and from Domcoy on Doms's right to
pursue his counterclaims and the effect of the default judgment
entered against McCoy and the sheriff's sale of McCoy's interest
i11 Rossi Hills on Doms's ownership interest in the property and
any damages for breach of ti t,l e warranties.

920653-CA
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ADDENDUM B

April 17, 1990, and during the trial the motion was renewed and Doms elected to proceed on
rescission.3 (R. 7087, 7759) On April 30, 1990, Judge Rokich issued a m e m o i andum decision
in which he held that rescission was not available to Doms. (R. 4244 et seq., Addendum 16)
Over the objection of plaintiffs, the trial court reconvened for the purpose of determining
i:

cumbrances existed and, if one was found, determining

damages even though Doms had not pleaded the contract action. (R 7753 et seq.) The bench
trial was held n 1 ViiiiwiMI ,'"!

Il

Ml

1 in Miinh-i I llll""»it ill

r< nil KMIOI llr firs! at five

memorandum decisions involving the contract claims. (R. 4348 et seq.) Finally, on June 23,
1992, the court issued its final Second Amended Findings and ( nm lu.sion* .mid SrcoiitJ Amended
Judgment.

(R. 6874 et seq.; Addendum 16)

Appropriate objections to the findings and

conclusions were made and accompanied by requests for additional findings and conclusions.
(

ddendum 1

Final judgment was entered on June 23, 1992. (R. 6900-

6907)
FACTS
This case involves undeveloped real estate situated in Park City, Summit County, referred
to as Rossi Hills.

The property was owned 'by Dan Scoli unl l» 1" -Vndeison AS inianls in

common. ( Exhibit 27)

4

Eugene Doms, through real estate agent Michael Sloan, made offers on behalf of himself

3

On December 19, 1988, the plaintiffs filed a related action against the defendants and
Summit County seeking to set aside a tax sale, Case #10066 (Supp.R. 1-66) The court
consolidated the case and determined the tax sale was void.
4

All exhibits referred to 1 1 illllii11 I nrl w n r mlmiiinl ,11 11 ill
in R7081-82 and R437-38.

6

I'\li(hii lisK air mnlanicd

and Michael R. McCoy to purchase Rossi Hills. (Exhibit 63) Negotiations proceeded and in
due course the property was sold for a purchase price of $2 7(\ I'Si) 00 on I cm is and u vul\ nig
parlies tiifTaio" from (he Imal earnest money agreement. (Exhibits 1 & 69) The sale was
consummated and a deed was executed by Dan Scott and his wife, Jeanne Scott, and ]
Aiiilci'M mi iii Il hi1 will Mini ,\i N
I In'viiii m
. M.iiilnis mi l,mn of Doms and McCoy, as grantees,
each with an undivided one-half interest. (Exhibit 1; Addendum 1) The sale was completed
pursuant to a tnr.ci:

:. *

*

allocation thereof. (Exhibit 69) On the March
deed note in the amount of $194,250.00 in tavor *

982, Doms and McCoy executed a trust
/\nuersoi

f

interest, ; : d Dan Scott as to an undivided one-half interest." (Exhibit 3; Addendum 2) The
note called for interest at the rate of 14% unless Doms and McCoy defaulted, in which case the
iiueresi unit HI mi I i

in H

MII nnir vus

a trust deed executed by Doms and

McCoy on the same date in favor of Scott and Anderson. (Exhibit 2; Addendum 3) Neither
Ellen Anderson, nor Jejune So»lf "i» I I ,m Mlii " m Ihc pinpi i"\ ri \\;v • ,mv i) .is IvuHn i.if v
of either the trust deed note or the trust deed.
Michael Sloan, a real estate agent, testified thai lie and hour, uulkoil Ilii: piopeih in
advance of the sale and observed the loop road and the other features later claimed to be
undisclosed encumbrances. (R.6883) Sloan testified that the property was not covered by snow
i"'I ll - il "'"<, i liiiincif encroachments were plainly visible. (R. 7653, 7658, 7661, 7662, 7663,
7664, 7667, 7686; Addendum 18)
purchase of Rossi Hills, Doms and
McCoy created a corporation called Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. (Exhibit 31; Addendum 5) The

7

first meeting of directors was held on November > _ , where stock certificates were issued
to Doms and McCoy

(Exhibit 32; Addendum <

^e corporation held annual meetings for

tlr vcars 1*W (Exhibit 35), 1984 (Exhibit 36), 1985 (Exhibit 37). Doms and McCoy, through
Domcoy, conducted a substantial amount of real estate business in of Utah as indicated by their
-)

On August 30, 1983, Doms and McCoy conveyed Rossi Hills to Domcoy Enterprises.
(Exhibit 16; Addendum ll Shnrll\ Uiani'tlri , |)oni< ny iIryHi»|tnl ;i IOIHI M iiliiir :ii»ianinii lor
the development of Rossi Hills and other adjacent properties.

(Exhibits 81, 82)

From 1982 Domcoy failed to pay the real estate taxes on the Rossi Hills property, and
in due course a tax sale was conducted. (Notice of Final Tax Sale Exhibit 5 to the Complaint
in consolidated case #10066.)
admitted to probate, and his widow,
Ellen Anderson, was appointed personal representative on November 30, 1982. She filed and
i'1- Jul HHI )"'« "»' i him JuaiiM <h< * • t;ii<- .ind

published the required

the time for filing claims expired long before this action was instituted. (R. 7988; Addendum
13)
Doms, McCoy and Domcoy failed to make payments required by the trust deed note and
thus, defaulted under the note. (Exhibit 6)
On June 5, 1985, Anderson's estate and Scott instituted an action to foreclose their trust
deed. (R. 1-9) Pursuant to the trust deed and provisions of the Utah Code, plaintiffs elected to
considerable negotiation
between the attorneys for both sides, defaults were taken and default judgment entered. (R. 34-

8

40) Subsequently, the default and judgment against Doms were set aside. (R. 64-6)
After entry of the default judgment and before it was set aside, Doms filed an answer and
a counterclaim for rescission only on January 29, 1988. (R. 41-44) In D o m s ' Certificate of
Compliance to the Order Setting Aside the Judgment, he agreed that all filings by him were
dleeiivc w* i HI Iiiiiir I I r> R S ml11 "Yi nH Vddendum 21) After the default judgment had been
set aside, on June 15, 1988, Doms filed an amended counterclaim requesting rescission only.
11s IU 11 inihiiih. iliiTealki Inn ml ,I SUOIKI iiiiniijcil nmiik n l.mit in|urstint?, rescission ;nid
damages for loss of profits and fraud. (R. 237 et seq.)
On August 2 -1 , 1988, Summit Count} sold R ossi I I l l s in a tax sale tc • D c m :: • :>>
August 26, 1988, more than three years after the complaint was filed and more than six years
after the original deed to Doms and McCoy, Doms obtained a deed from Domcoy. (Exhibit 17)
t of the foreclosure action, Doms could claim some
type

ownership or

of title in the Rossi Hills property

.- -

A

>

- _ J : -i uii.

August 26, 1988,

t the time Doms asked for
' acqi lire e\ en

one month after filing the seconded amended

counterclaim.
Domcoy Enterprises had been involuntarily dissolved on December 31, 1986 (Exhibit 39;
Addendum 7), approximately two years before the deed in fav or of Doms was executed.
(Exhibit 17; Addendum 8) The deed executed by the corporation was executed by Doms acting
only as an officer (not a director) of the corporation despite the fact that the charter had been
of Doms himself.

(Exhibit 17; Addendum 8)

Doms' claim for rescission was tried to the district couiI
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The court held that the

<n

contract could not be rescinded. (R. 4244-50; Addendum 15) The court further determined that
the election to pursue rescission did not constitute an election of remedies and a trial would
proctvJ ni -i Lili i Jalc to determine damages for violating the deed covenant against
encumbrances. (R 7757) Six years and four months had expired before these unrelated causes
cil ..tiliuii vrnii1 (ml I! Ihriclnn

nl.niilil'ts iinmol Ikil Hit1 sliitute of limitations had expired. (R.

3421-25) Nevertheless, the district court held that under U.R.C.P. Rule 15(c), Doms' unpled
cause of action

)

After trial, the district court concluded that "the Warranty Deed, Trust Deed Note and Trust
Deed do not constitute a single contract" contradicting the basis for its earlie r ruling relating
to the transactions and applying Rule 15(c) U.R.C.P. (R. 6890) The court also determined that
Doms, who was a remote grantee of the property by reason of the purported purchase of the
Ko;

damages

icli n| Hie covenant against

encumbrances contained in the prior deed to Doms and McCoy who had divested themselves of
Rossi Hills, <i

mil In. lit Hi.ill

MIH h ILIUMI'I S uniilld

he sctolf in In el, ill

JIMIIISI

the

purchase price of the property that was sold ten years prior to the determination of damages and
all of the purchase and financing contracts should be revised to reflect this setoff, thoi igh Doms
only acquired a one-half interest.
Plaintiffs were required to institute an action against Summit County to set aside the tax
determine its invalidity. If the sale was valid, then plaintiffs' rights to foreclose the
trust deed would be eliminated as title would vest in Summit County free of any claim of prior
#10066, \ • nnsolidated into this case

T'he court,

on hearing the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, determined that the tax sale was invalid,
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thereby reconfirming the title to Rossi Hills in Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. subject to the trust
deed in favor of Anderson and Scott. (U f »M% /()(>4), I lie action was instituted and conducted
\

attorneys for the plaintiffs in order to protect themselves and Doms and McCoy from

being divested of all interest in the property by reason of the failure of the defendants to pay the
t
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appropriate
and the parties to this action substantial time and expense.
Plaintiffs first assert that Doms' counterclaim was i

>.

Doms' initial answer and counterclaim was filed just two months before the expiration of the sixyear limitations period. However, default judgment against Doms had been entered before the
answe r i nd : ounterclaim an :i his Certificate of Compliance with the order setting aside the
default judgment specifically stated that the answer and counterclaim would not be officially
accepted until a date wliiili \\ i. iillni ilir lApiialinii nil! lillui liiml.ilinii< primd

Subsequent

counterclaims made by Doms were outside the limitations period.
Plaintiffs allege that the trial court's implied hokii :

d

back to plaintiffs' original complaint is erroneous. Doms' counterclaim concerned a different
transaction than plaintiffs' original complaint I furthermore, the counterclaim involved parties
iiH i.Tiwiped in the original action. The trial court did not apply the correct standards in
determining whether the counterclaim related back to the original complaint.
i Ma ml 11 f "• \ i >i ml i .1 11 in mi i ni .11 i • i ni ni 1 i | p r o c e e d i n g w i t h a s e c o n d t r i a l o n t h e i s s u e o f d a m a g e s

after Doms had elected the remedy of rescission and failed. The doctrine of election of remedies

11

ADDENDUM C

n igyyy vwfc,w*

Anderson & Scott v. Doms & McCoy

Statute of Limitations
Oct-Nov.1981
Dams inspected
and had actual notice
of encumbrances
(Findings of Fact #33,
3Ml,fiaiul43).
March 23, 1985
Three-Year
Statute of
K
Limitations
on Fraud
Claim expired.

'81

Jan 21,1988
Default
Judgments
entered.

March 23,1986
Four-vear
Statule of
Limitation on
Rescission
expired.

82 '83 '84 '85 '86 '87
Mardi 22,1982
Sale closed. Deed
recorded. Trust
deed delivered
(Exhibits 1,2-69),

I

June 6,1985
Mr. Anderson
and Mr Scott
file complaint
to foreclose
Trust Deed
as mortgage*

IJan 29,1988
Answer and
Counterclaim
for rescission
filed but not
effective as
J judgment is
In effect
(R 41-44)
March 23,1988
Six-Year Statute
ofLimitations
on Contract
Claim expired.

June 1,1968
Doms files certificate
of compliance agreeing
that the effective date
for the acceptance of
the Answer & Counter^
claim is June 1,1988
(R-76-78Addedum21

to brief).
June 15,1988
Amended Answer
and Counterclaim
(Requested only
Rescissions ana
Lost Profits),

1988

July 5,1988
Court signed order authorizing joinder
oiMrs. Anderson and Mre> Scott
as Lnvoluntary plaintiffs.
Order authorizingfilingof Second
Amended Counterclaim and thefifingthereof,
• 1st Oaim. Rescission (titing Bergstrom v. Moore)
conditioned on tender crfproper^ to p l a i n t ^
•2nd Gaim. Lost Profits (Doms abandoned this
claim (R-79 27-30).
•3rd Claim. Fraud (Doms consented to dismissal
of this claim (R-7763-64) and waived any right to
consequential damages (R-7971) or damages that I
arise by reason of "spedaT being placed on deed

Aug. 20,1988
Doms Received
deed from Domcoy
(First time he
obtains title)
-{Exhibits 11 &66).

